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Abstract. Although preferences for redistribution have been widely studied in the economic literature, 
their relationship with risk preferences has received only marginal attention so far. The aim of this work 
is to provide evidence on this topic using a between-subject laboratory experiment and a fine grid to 
measure individual risk-attitudes. Our findings suggest that the more people are risk averse, the more 
they are in favor of redistribution across members of a society that allows upward social mobility, but it 
is also characterized by uncertainty about the final position in the income ladder. Our interpretation is 
that individuals exploit redistributive taxation as a form of insurance against uncertainty in the outcome 
of their effort. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic literature has widely studied the topic of preferences for redistribution by means 
of field studies and laboratory experiments, analyzing the potential role of many determinants: 
from fairness and efficiency concerns to cultural attitudes, from political institutions to racial 
fragmentation (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). However, the role of 
individual risk attitudes has received so far little attention, despite their obvious importance for 
understanding the heterogeneous support for redistribution policies in real-world economies, 
usually characterized by some degree of uncertainty about individual future income. For 
instance, people may rationally consider that they, or their children, may better their position 
in the income distribution over time; hence, they vote today for less redistribution (the well-
known Prospect Of Upward Mobility, or POUM, hypothesis, from Benabou and Ok, 2001). 
However, future incomes are by definition risky: people are not sure both on the real outcomes 
of their effort to climb the income ladder, but also on the tax rules that would be in force in the 
future. In the presence of a high uncertainty about ones’ future income, risk averse individuals 
may well decide to support more redistribution as a form of insurance against possible future 
negative shocks. Hence, individual risk attitudes should play a role in shaping preferences 
toward redistribution. 
The first references to risk attitudes in the context of redistribution are due to Rawls (1971) Veil 
of Ignorance and the following experimental test proposed by Beck (1994) that provided little 
evidence that individuals may favor a more equal income distribution if they are more risk-
averse. However, one limit of this study was in the design, which considered the choice of 
lotteries as the unique determinants of participants’ final payoffs, without accounting for the 
possibility of upward mobility via individual effort, as it happens in real-world societies. More 
recently, only Durante et al. (2014) have incidentally explored the issue, by designing a 
laboratory experiment that explicitly considers both individual risk attitudes and costly effort 
in the analysis. Preferences for redistribution are elicited in a context where rules determining 
the income distribution vary from completely random to completely linked to individual effort. 
The authors show that the riskier the income determination rule, the higher the demand for 
redistribution. However, Durante et al. (2014) focus on the impact of individual perception of 
social fairness on preferences for redistribution, and just consider risk attitudes among control 
variables in their analysis. Unsurprisingly, the elicitation mechanism is rough, and coefficients 
for risk-attitudes are often not statistically significant and contradictory in sign.  
The purpose of our study is to provide evidence on the role of risk attitudes in shaping 
preferences for redistribution, by designing a laboratory experiment with two main 
characteristics:  first, we exploit a pure between-subject design, which allows us to avoid 
potential confounding effects driven by moral concerns when studying the relationship between 
risk preferences and the demand for redistributive taxation; second, we elicit preferences using a 
grid that allows a precise measurement of individual risk-attitudes.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The experimental design and its practical 
implementation are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the results, showing the evidence 
from both mean comparisons across treatments and regression analysis. Section 4 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Experimental design and implementation  
Our experiment has been designed to specifically analyze the relationship between individual 
risk attitudes and preferences for redistribution. We  aim at testing whether more risk averse 
individuals exhibit stronger preferences for income redistribution, especially when they are 
asked to make their choices in environments characterized by high uncertainty about their final 
positions in the income ladder.  
In particular, to pursue our goal, we set up a framework in which we first elicit risk attitudes of 
subjects and, second, after assigning an initial endowment, we ask participants to take part in a 
real effort task that allows them to improve their initial income, while at the same time deciding 
the desired level of taxation. In this way, they will reveal their preferences for redistribution in 
a society that allows upward social mobility. More in details, the participants are asked to select 
their ideal rate 𝑡௜∗of a (very simple) purely redistributive proportional income tax, where tax 
revenues are then equally shared among all individuals (N). Subjects’ after-tax income Yat is 
defined according to Eq. [1]: 
     
i
e
i
e
i
at
i tyyN
tyyY *1*1        [1] 
where y is the initial exogenous income (the same for all the participants), 𝑦௜௘ is the incremental 
income that can be gained by individual i exercising effort e, and t* is the chosen tax rate to be 
applied to all subjects. To avoid strategic responses, we select t* according to the random dictator 
rule, randomly extracting a rate from all the values 𝑡௜∗ chosen by the participants.1 Hence, the 
role of participants’ average income is pivotal in our framework: everyone with a final gross 
income ( eiyy  ) above the mean is a net taxpayer (i.e., she pays more taxes than the transfer 
she receives), while the opposite is true for the subjects with incomes below the mean (i.e., they 
are net recipients). Moreover, the threshold average income is unknown a priori since it depends 
on both the common initial exogenous income and the additional (endogenous) incomes 
associated to individual choices of effort level; this introduces some uncertainty about subjects’ 
future income.  
As the main purpose of our study is not to check the stability of individual preferences (for 
which a within-subject design would be required), but to investigate the possible variations in 
the average demand for redistribution driven by different risk attitudes and the exposure to 
environments characterized by different (exogenous) risk levels, we used a between-subject 
design, where each individual is exposed to only one treatment; thus, we avoid carry-over and 
experimenter demand effects.2 In particular, the behavioral hypotheses tested in our 
experiment are the following:  
a) risk-attitudes affect preferences for redistribution. In particular, we expect that more risk averse 
individuals demand more redistribution, choosing a higher tax rate;  
b) the riskiness of the economic environment matters for redistribution. In particular, risk averse 
individuals are expected to prefer more redistribution when they face a partially random reward for 
their effort with respect to a situation in which effort reward is sure.  
Here the underlying assumption is that risk averse individuals may prefer a higher degree of 
redistribution in face of higher uncertainty, in order to insure themselves against potentially 
higher income losses; and this increase in the demand for redistribution should be higher for 
individuals characterized by a higher degree of risk aversion. The experiment took place at the 
School of Management and Economics of the University of Torino, on October 7th, 2015. 
Subjects were recruited by means of a leaflet distributed among students of Business and 
Economics classes, both at undergraduate and graduate level. We ran two sessions – each of 
which lasted about two hours – with a total of 39 participants, using two different treatments: a 
first treatment in which the reward of the effort was perfectly known by subjects (Session 1 – 
certain effort reward, 20 subjects); and a second treatment in which the reward of the effort was 
                                                          
1 This experimental setup is similar to that adopted in the recent studies by Durante et al. (2014) and Beraldo et al. 
(2014). 
2 For a throughout discussion of merits and limits of the two types of experimental design and the choice of the 
more appropriate approach see Charness et al. (2012).    
partially randomly determined (Session 2 – uncertain effort reward, 19 subjects); the aim of the 
second treatment is to simulate a more risky economic environment, where the outcomes of 
social mobility are even more uncertain in terms of final income. Each session was organized in 
three parts. In part A, we elicited individual risk preferences, by asking subjects to choose 
between a lottery and different certain amounts of money. In part B, subjects decided the 
number of exercises to be solved when performing the effort task and chose their preferred tax 
rate. Part C was a brief survey in which subjects were asked some personal data like sex and 
age, and their opinions on the perceived social mobility and individual beliefs about the source 
of income inequalities. After subjects entered the room, general instructions were read aloud, 
leaving opportunities for questions. The structure of the experiment was then explained, as well 
as the decision sequence and the computation of final rewards. Participants were also informed 
that during the whole experiment an ad-hoc currency named “token” had to be used, and the 
conversion rate for the actual payment was set at 1 token = 0.01 Euros for the risk aversion test 
and 1 token = 0.03 Euros for the redistribution game. The higher payment on the redistribution 
game was set in order to place higher monetary incentives on this part of the experiment, so as 
to stimulate in the subjects the perception of social mobility and observe enough variability in 
effort and tax rate preferences. Subjects’ earnings, determined according to their performance in 
the two tasks of the experiment (risk aversion test and redistribution game), were paid in cash 
at the end of each session.3 The time sequence of different tasks and decisions is represented in 
Figure 1. Below we will discuss the main features of the first two parts of the experiment, while 
detailed instructions and the whole set of survey questions are reported in the Appendix. 
 
                                                          
3 The average payment was 3.52 Euros, with and a minimum of 0.85 Euros and a maximum of 5.69 Euros. There 
was also a coffee bonus for showing up as a reserve. We are aware of the fact that the stakes the participants face in 
our experiment are smaller than in other similar studies. However, adopting the Reward Dominance criterion 
proposed by Alm and Jacobson (2007), these rewards, even if small, may be considered large enough to be able to 
offset subjective costs that individuals place on the participation in the experiment. First, students are likely to 
have quite low opportunity costs, even more so since 80% of the students were already planning to visit the School 
where the experiment was taking place to attend already scheduled lectures. Second, monetary incentives were 
framed in term of tokens, hence subjects has to deal with numbers higher than final actual payments. Third, the 
literature on incentive mechanisms has shown that average subjects’ responses do not change substantially with 
the size of payments, but there is a higher variance in the answers when low monetary incentives are used (e.g., 
Smith and Walker, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). 
Figure 1. Time sequence of experimental tasks and decisions 
 
2.1. Risk aversion test 
The first part of experiment (Part A) is related to testing subjects’ risk preferences. This part 
was the same for both treatments and is crucial to our experiment, given our behavioral 
hypotheses discussed above. As a method of elicitation of risk preferences we used a version of 
the Multiple Price List method originally proposed by Holt and Laury (2002). In particular, the 
version applied here is the approach used, e.g., in Dohmen et al. (2010) and discussed in 
Abdellaoui (2011), which relies on a longer list of options to choose from (20 instead of 10), thus 
allowing a finer assessment of risk attitudes. The risk aversion test involves choices between a 
safe amount and a lottery (Table 1) and it is easy to understand and to implement in a paper-
and-pencil context. The number of tokens  shown in Table 1 is of the same order of magnitude 
of the tokens that subjects face during the second part of the experiment. Specifically, the 
expected value of the lottery in Column B (75) was fixed to the average between the lowest and 
the highest number of tokens we expected people may have to deal with in the redistribution 
game. 
Column A in Table 1 reports a safe amount of tokens that increases from row to row, while 
Column B shows a lottery with which the subject can either win 150 tokens or nothing with 
equal probability, and it is the same in each row. Subjects were asked to choose between 
Column A and Column B starting from the first row to the last row. For the first row, choosing 
Column B is the rational choice. At some point, however, subjects are expected to switch to 
Column A; and risk loving subjects will switch later than risk averse ones. More precisely, 
subjects that decide to stop choosing the lottery exactly at row 16 are classified as risk neutral, 
since the certain equivalent is just equal to the expected value of the lottery, while those 
switching before (after) row 16 are classified as risk averse (loving). It is worth highlighting that 
this procedure allowed us to assess on a 1-20 scale participants’ risk attitudes, thus obtaining a 
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more precise measure of risk aversion (due to the finer grid) than, e.g., in Durante et al. (2014) 
and Gärtner et al. (2017), where risk attitudes were evaluated using a less refined scale.4   
 
Table 1. The risk aversion test 
Row Column A Column B Choice 
1 0 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
2 5 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
3 10 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
4 15 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
5 20 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
6 25 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
7 30 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
8 35 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
9 40 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
10 45 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
11 50 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
12 55 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
13 60 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
14 65 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
15 70 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
16 75 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
17 80 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
18 85 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
19 90 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
20 95 tokens 50% 150 tokens - 50% 0 tokens A      B 
 
As noted before, part of the subject’s final payment is related to her performance in this task. In 
each session, one of the 20 rows in Table 1 was randomly selected at the end of the experiment 
and the choice made by participants in that row was paid, allowing each subject to individually 
play the lottery in Column B if necessary. Suppose, for instance, that at the end of the 
experiment, row 7 is the outcome of the random draw from an urn with numbers from 1 to 20. 
If in that row a subject’s choice was A, she will receive the amount of Euros corresponding to 30 
tokens; if instead a subject’s choice was B, she will play the lottery by throwing a die and will 
win 0 tokens if the outcome is 1, 2 or 3 and 150 tokens if the outcome is 4, 5 or 6.  
                                                          
4 Indeed, Durante et al. (2014) used a 1-5 scale and Gärtner et al. (2017) a 1-8 scale. Moreover, the assessment of 
risk preferences in Gärtner et al. (2017), unlike the incentivized risk attitude measures elicited in the laboratory, 
suffers also the limit to rely on a survey approach, where respondents face hypothetical choices between a lottery 
and a safe value and do not receive any monetary payment for their performance in the test.          
2.2. Choice of effort and the preferred tax rate  
The second part of the experiment (Part B) involved the participants in an “effort” task and the 
tax rate decision. As for the “effort” task, our idea was to let subjects feel that additional 
income 𝑦௜௘ in equation [1] was non-trivially earned; that is to say, to feel that effort was really 
costly.  In our experimental setting, such cost was interpreted as a time-consuming activity that 
required some ability to be performed. The effort task chosen here was proposed, e.g., by Buch 
and Engel (2012) and has the appealing feature of being easy to administer in a paper-and-
pencil experiment, but also complex enough to require people to exert real effort in order to 
perform it. It consisted in finding how many couples of numbers added up to 10 in 4x4 tables, 
an example of which is represented in Table 2. Each table had at least one couple adding up to 
10, and at most four. The size of the tables was chosen in order to make the task as challenging 
as possible, and 4x4 was the maximum size presented to subjects in Buch and Engel (2012). 
 
Table 2. Example of effort task 
2.15 4.19 3.22 6.01 
8.02 6.78 1.08 4.05 
1.01 7.54 4.93 9.99 
2.02 5.68 4.33 1.69 
 
In order to allow subjects to correctly understand the task and their abilities in solving the 
exercises, first, subjects were given ten minutes to practice over the task with 10 tables. At the 
end of this practice round, solutions were shown to allow participants to self-assess their 
performance and their productivity in the task. At this point, information about the initial 
income (equal for all participants) and the reward associated to effort was displayed, and each 
subject had to decide simultaneously both the level of effort and the desired tax rate.  
Each subject was asked to commit to solve a number between zero and 25 exercises. In the 
baseline treatment (Session 1), subjects knew that each exercise they solved would have 
contributed  deterministically to increase their final income by 2 tokens. In order to make the 
task even more challenging, the commitment was for the number of correctly solved exercises 
(ne); hence, subjects were not allowed to leave the room until they correctly solved the number 
they had chosen, and the number of additional tokens generated by the effort was computed as 
ye = ne2. In the second treatment (Session 2), the link between effort and reward became 
uncertain, since reward now can vary between 1 to 2 tokens. When all subjects solved the 
number of exercises they have committed to, a random number p between 0.5 and 1 – with 
increments of 0.1 – was drawn by each subject, and the actual number of tokens produced by 
her effort was then computed as ye = ne2p.5  
While committing to a desired level of effort, participants had also to choose their preferred 
income tax rate t*, under the rule that the whole amount of fiscal revenues had to be equally 
divided among all participants. We allowed subjects to choose between values of t* ranging 
from zero to 100%, limiting internal options to those defined by 10% increases between the two 
extremes (i.e., 10%, 20%, …, 90%).  At the end of the experiment, an extraction from an urn 
was made in order to determine the actual tax rate t* defined by the random dictator rule and 
each subject was paid the after-tax income atiY  according to Eq. [1].  
Let us make a simple numerical example to illustrate the mechanism determining final payoffs: 
suppose there are only two participants, Mrs. 1 and Mrs. 2. Their initial income y is equal to 100 
tokens (the same used in the experiment). Mrs. 1 commits herself to solve 10 exercises, while the 
effort of Mrs. 2 is 20 exercises. If they are playing in Session 1, their final income is given by 
their initial income plus 102 tokens (the effort reward) for Mrs. 1 and 202 tokens for Mrs. 2. 
Hence, the final gross income (y + ye) is 120 for Mrs. 1 and 140 for Mrs. 2. Assuming that 
preferred tax rates are 50% and 30% for Mrs. 1 and 2, respectively, and that, under the random 
dictator rule, an actual tax rate t* = 50% (30%) had been chosen, Mrs. 1 is paying 60 (36) as a 
tax, while Mrs. 2 is paying 70 (42). Total tax revenue are then 130 (78) and each subject receives 
a transfer of 65 (39), leaving final after-tax income Yat for Mrs. 1 at 125 (123) tokens and for 
Mrs. 2 at 135 (137) tokens. Hence, Mrs. 1 is a net recipient, while Mrs. 2 a net taxpayer. 
 
3. Results 
In this section we discuss our findings, concentrating on the role that risk preferences and the 
riskiness of the economic environment play in shaping individual preferences for redistribution. 
In particular, in presenting our experimental findings, we start by discussing some descriptive 
statistics for risk attitudes (Section 3.1) and the preferred degree of redistribution (Section 
3.2.1); we then focus on the relationship between the two variables in Section 3.2.2. As a 
premise for the discussion of results, one can notice from Table 2 that the participants’ 
characteristics in terms of gender, age and level of education appear to be roughly balanced 
                                                          
5 In the survey carried out at the end of the experiment, we also asked the participants whether they found 
difficulties in solving the exercises. The answers provided comforting information, since the task was perceived as 
hard but not too hard by the subjects: on a 1-5 scale (where 1 is extremely easy and 5 extremely difficult) the 
average response was 2.4 and no subject chose 5. The practice round of the design, that allowed the participants to 
familiarize with effort task, was also assessed as useful, since only 10% of students reported to have overestimated 
the number of exercises they were ready to solve. 
across the two sessions, thus supporting the comparability of the choices made by subjects 
under different treatments.  
 
Table 2. Characteristics of participants by treatment  
 
Session 1 
(certain effort reward) 
N = 20 
Session 2 
(uncertain effort reward) 
N = 19 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Female (%) 0.55 0.51 0.58 0.51 
Age 22 1.60 22 2.57 
Undergraduate (%) 0.70 0.47 0.63 0.50 
 
3.1. Measuring risk attitudes 
In order to analyze the relationship between preferences for redistribution and risk attitudes, a 
precise measure of risk attitudes is needed. The measure we consider here is defined according to 
the number of times the subject selected the lottery over the certain amount in the risk aversion 
test: the more risk averse the participant, the lower the number of rows the subject needed in 
order to stop choosing the lottery. As a consequence, the higher the value of the variable, the 
lower the degree of risk aversion. We call this risk attitude measure RISK_LOVE accordingly. 
A critical issue to assess the validity of experimentally measured risk preferences is the degree to 
which subjects were able to understand the task. Given the structure of the Multiple Price Lists, 
any rational individual who understood the instructions would switch column only once, 
multiple switches denoting the inability of understanding the problem at hand. In the Holt and 
Laury (2002) experimental session most comparable with our test (i.e., the one with very low 
and hypothetical stakes), roughly 10% of subjects did not understand the task and submitted 
contradicting answers; a comparable share was found in our data (six subjects, corresponding to 
about 15%). It is also worth to mention that some subjects in the original Holt and Laury 
(2002) experiment switched in the first or in the last row, exhibiting quite extreme attitudes 
toward risk: these subjects were considered by the authors among those who did not understand 
the instructions. This pattern of extreme choices was not present in our test. Looking at our 
data, the majority of subjects who switched more than once (one student in Session 1 and three 
students in Session 2) displayed a clear pattern of choices, and it was possible to define a narrow 
“switching area” instead of a precise switching point. As far as these students were concerned, it 
was still possible to estimate their risk attitudes as the average of the switching area. Only two 
subjects in Session 2 exhibited a pattern of choices that did not allow us to estimate a measure 
for their risk attitudes, hence we dropped these individuals from the analysis and the discussion 
of results that follows refer to a reduced sample of 37 subjects.  
Considering now the risk attitudes recorded during the experiment, all the participants 
displayed risk aversion or risk neutrality: our RISK_LOVE variable ranges from 3 to 16, with a 
mean of 9.5 and a standard deviation of 3.7. Risk loving subjects are rare to find in experiments, 
even though in Holt and Laury (2002) a small share of subjects (about 6%) were classified as 
such. The difference with respect to our results may be due to the fact that students of Business 
and Economics are likely to be more acquainted with the computation of the expected value of 
a lottery than students with a different background.6 Focusing on gender differences in risk 
attitudes, we find that females are slightly more risk averse than males (average RISK_LOVE 
is equal to 8.8 and 10.3, respectively), but the difference between means is not statistically 
significant according to a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test (p=0.25). Thus, our data does not 
support the main evidence in the experimental literature that gender matters for risk attitudes 
and female are in general more risk averse than males (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
However, some recent research on the topic by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) has pointed out 
that women may seem more risk averse than men because they are indeed more loss averse, and 
the majority of the existing tests are not able to disentangle the two forces at stake.7 As for the 
variability of risk attitudes across the two sessions, the distribution of RISK_LOVE is quite 
stable: the mean ranges from 9.1 (st. dev. 3.5) in Session 1 to 9.9 (st. dev. 4) in Session 2 and the 
difference between treatments is not statistically significant according to the Mann-Whitney 
test (p=0.53). Moreover, the median and the third quartile are almost equal in the two 
treatments (9.5/11.8 in Session 1 vs. 10/12.5 in Session 2), which highlights that in both 
scenarios the percentage of risk-averse subjects is significantly greater than the percentage of 
risk-neutral subjects. Notice that the fact that the distribution of the elicited risk attitude 
measures – as well as of the other individual features (Table 2) – is similar across the two 
scenarios is crucial for the test on the difference in the preferences for redistribution between the 
                                                          
6 It should also be noted that most experimental tests dealing with establishing the best method to elicit risk 
preferences through lotteries use stakes different from those of our experiment. In particular, only Holt and Laury 
(2002) adopt a lottery comparable with our design. For a general discussion of the different methods to elicit risk 
preferences see Crosetto and Filippin (2016). 
7 Notice also that the original Holt and Laury (2002) Multiple Price Lists approach is unlikely to be affected by the 
loss aversion problem and the results about gender differences are contradictory when their test is used to measure 
risk attitudes. Moreover, in our study we exploit the extended version of this approach by Dohmen et al. (2010) 
that provides less clear reference points for the subjects and hence should avoid even more potential confounding 
effects due to loss aversion. 
‘certain effort reward’ treatment and the ‘uncertain effort reward’ case (see Section 3.2.1). 
Comparability makes subjects in the two scenarios as sampled from the same population, hence 
making comparisons reliable.         
 
3.2. Preferences for redistribution 
Looking at choices of the preferred degree of redistribution, the average tax rate t* computed 
over the two sessions is 25% (standard deviation 0.28). The value is considerably lower than 
those found in some recent studies (e.g., Durante et al., 2014; Beraldo et al., 2014), since t* in 
comparable treatments, was around 39%. There are two possible explanation for this difference: 
one is related to the specificities of our sample, entirely composed by students of Business and 
Economics, who are likely to be driven more by self-interested motivations than students with a 
different background. The second explanation is related to the lower stakes in our experiment, 
as subjects might have anticipated the low final payment, and tried to increase the net payment 
as much as possible. Interestingly, women seem to prefer lower levels of redistribution with 
respect to men (19% vs. 34%), even if the Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis only 
at 10% level of significance (p=0.09), requiring further investigation on these gender issues via 
multivariate regression analysis in order to control for possible confounding factors.  
3.2.1. Comparison of average tax rates across treatments 
According to our behavioral hypotheses, risk-averse subjects (the majority in both sessions) are 
expected to react to changes in the treatment (certainty/uncertainty in rewarding effort) by 
selecting different tax rates t*. In other words, we expect individuals to ask for more or less 
redistribution depending on the probability of social mobility, which is linked to the degree of 
uncertainty of their position in the final income distribution (i.e., their final monetary payoff). 
The idea is that redistributive taxation can be used as a form of insurance and, consequently, 
the higher a subject’s risk aversion, the higher its desired level of t*, and the stronger its 
reaction in terms of  increasing t* when moving from a certain to an uncertain reward for effort. 
From Figure 2, exploiting the between-subject nature of the design, one can see that the average 
t* chosen by individuals across sessions seem to confirm our expectations, since the average t* 
increases (from 19% to 32%) when uncertainty about the reward of their effort is introduced. 
This evidence support the view that people are likely to exploit the redistribution as an 
insurance mechanism against potentially negative outcomes in the final income distribution.  
 
Figure 2. Average tax rate selected by subjects in each session 
 
Note: Session 1 is certain effort reward; Session 2 is uncertain effort reward. 
 
Figure 3. Average tax rate selected by high risk averse subjects  
 
Note: Session 1 is certain effort reward; Session 2 is uncertain effort reward. 
 
It is worth noticing, however, that the difference between Sessions 1 and 2 is not statistically 
significant according to the Mann-Whitney test (p=0.15). A possible explanation may be that 
the change in the level of risk between the two scenarios was not large enough to induce 
participants – and in particular those with a low degree of risk aversion – to react modifying 
remarkably their ideal tax rate. In order to test this hypothesis, we consider a reduced sample of 
high risk averse individuals, those who are expected to change their behavior most across risk 
treatments. In particular, we define a subsample of individuals that displayed a degree of risk 
aversion not lower than the median level computed on the whole sample, i.e., values of 
RISK_LOVE equal or lower than 10. As expected, when looking at this subsample only (Figure 
3), the difference in the average t* between Sessions 1 and 2 is larger than before (t* increases 
from 21% to 43%) and now it is also statistically significant (p=0.05), thus confirming that high 
risk averse individuals prefer more redistribution when the uncertainty of their final payoff 
increases.  
3.2.2. Regression analysis 
In order to investigate more in depth the relationship between redistributive preferences and 
risk attitudes, we carried out a regression analysis estimating a Tobit model with the tax rate t* 
as the dependent variable. In particular, we adopted an incremental regression approach: we 
first consider a baseline model which includes among the covariates only the main variables of 
interest, without accounting for potential confounding factors; then, in order to test the 
robustness of our results, we progressively enriched the baseline model by accounting for some 
participants’ characteristics that could somewhat interplay with risk-related variables in 
determining individual preferences for redistribution.  
In the baseline specification (Model 1 in Table 3) we included: a dummy variable for the risk 
treatment (UNCERTAINTY), which is equal to 1 for Session 2 with uncertain effort reward; 
our measure of subjective risk attitudes (RISK_LOVE); the interaction between exogenous 
uncertainty and risk attitudes (UNCERTAINTY*RISK_LOVE); the individual effort choice, 
i.e., the number of correctly solved exercises to which an individual has committed in the effort 
task of the experiment (EFFORT).  
In a first extension of this specification (Model 2) we added a set of controls for demographic 
characteristics (FEMALE = 1 for females; AGE, which is student’s age; ITALIAN = 1 for 
Italian students). Then, we also accounted for the role of students’ characteristics (Model 3: 
UNDER_GRADUATE = 1 for undergraduate students; ECON_DEPT = 0/1 for those subjects 
enrolled in a degree offered by the Department of Business/Economics; ECON_EXAMS, which 
is the number of courses in economics attended by the subject). Finally, we included a set of 
controls for their opinions and perceptions (Model 4), using participants’ answers to the survey 
carried out at the end of the experiment. In particular, we focused on issues that have shown 
some predictive power in previous studies on preferences for redistribution (e.g., Checchi and 
Filippin 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Beraldo et al., 2014) 
and considered the role played by the perceived social mobility (BETTER_FATHER = 1 for 
subjects that believe to have better chances of earnings than their father) and by beliefs about 
the main source of income inequalities (SUCCESS_LUCK, which takes values from 1 to 5 
according to the importance placed on luck as a determinant of economic success; 
POOR_TRAP, which takes values from 1 to 5 and measures the extent to which one believes 
that poor people are trapped in their condition because of their lack of effort in looking for a 
job). Table A1 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for all the variables used in the 
regression analysis. 
 
Table 3. Tobit regression estimates. Dependent variable: selected tax rate t* 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
UNCERTAINTY     0.890**    1.093**    0.888**     0.986*** 
 (0.426) (0.413) (0.328) (0.341) 
RISK_LOVE  0.010 0.019 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) 
UNCERTAINTY*RISK_LOVE  -0.069*   -0.089**  -0.079**     -0.088*** 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.031) (0.031) 
EFFORT 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
FEMALE -     -0.442***     -0.422***       -0.463*** 
  (0.161) (0.127) (0.119) 
AGE - 0.034 -0.060 -0.051 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.035) 
ITALIAN - -0.138 0.370  0.405* 
  (0.258) (0.248) (0.224) 
UNDER_GRADUATE - - 0.112 0.176 
   (0.173) (0.140) 
ECON_DEPT - - -0.084 -0.109 
   (0.100) (0.079) 
ECON_EXAMS - -      0.114***      0.131*** 
   (0.021) (0.027) 
BETTER_FATHER - - - 0.097 
    (0.107) 
SUCCESS_LUCK - - -     0.180** 
    (0.080) 
POORS_TRAP - - - -0.097 
    (0.063) 
Observations 37 37 37 37 
Prob > 2 0.268 0.113 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.308 0.585 0.682 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Combined skewness and kurtosis 
test for normality cannot reject the null hypothesis that t* and RISK_LOVE are normally distributed (p-
value is 0.1370 and 0.2538, respectively).   
 
Results on the role of risk in shaping preferences for redistribution are consistent across all the 
specifications and confirms the evidence based on descriptive statistics discussed in the previous 
section. Moreover, the extension of the basic specification to include possible confounding 
effects progressively increases the goodness of fit of the statistical model, without basically 
altering the magnitude and the significance of coefficients of the main variables of interest.8 
Therefore, we will refer to the most complete specification (Model 4) in commenting our 
estimates. Table 3 shows that introducing uncertainty in effort reward increases the preferred 
tax rate, conditionally to the degree of subjective risk attitudes: indeed, while first-order 
coefficient of UNCERTAINTY is positive, its interaction with RISK_LOVE is negative and 
the total effect remains positive until the value of RISK_LOVE is below or equal to 11, a 
threshold close to the sample median value used in the test of the difference in average t* 
between Sessions 1 and 2 for high risk averse individuals (Figure 3). This finding supports the 
view that high risk averse individuals are likely to prefer more redistribution when they have to 
take their decisions in more risky environments, while low risk averse and risk neutral 
individuals (i.e., those with values of RISK_LOVE between 12 and 16) and – a fortiori – the 
risk loving ones (.e., those with values of RISK_LOVE higher than 16) are expected to prefer 
lower tax rates. Interestingly, the variable RISK_LOVE shows the expected negative 
relationship with t* and it is statistically significant only in the treatment with uncertainty 
effort reward, as highlighted by the interaction between RISK_LOVE and UNCERTAINTY; 
this result suggests that the individuals operating in very risky environments will ask for more 
redistribution when their risk aversion increases, in order to insure against the strong 
uncertainty in the final income distribution, while subjective risk attitudes do not play a 
significant role in shaping preferences for redistribution when individuals take their decisions in 
low risk environments. As for the effect of the individual effort (EFFORT), we do not uncover 
any clear relationship with the preferred tax rate, as its coefficient is very small and always 
statistically insignificant; hence, individual decisions on optimal effort and the desired 
redistribution appear to be here  basically independent. 
Looking now at the role of the other variables in the models, the presence of gender differences 
(FEMALE) is persistent across all specifications and confirms that women prefer lower levels of 
redistribution with respect to men. Notice that some previous studies support the opposite 
conclusion (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Durante et al., 2014), while other contributions 
(e.g., Checchi and Filippin, 2004; Beraldo et al., 2014) are consistent with our findings. A 
possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that American and European women have 
different attitudes toward redistribution, but further research is needed in order to understand 
                                                          
8 Rather, the statistical significance of the coefficient of UNCERTANTY and of its interaction with RISK_LOVE 
increases in the most complete specification (Model 4). 
the heterogeneity of the results across studies. Another interesting finding (in Model 4) is that 
Italian born subjects (ITALIAN) ask for more redistribution than foreign born ones. This 
pattern may be due to the fact that the latter are all immigrants, hence they, or their parents, 
left the country of origin in order to better their economic position. Consequently, according to 
the POUM hypothesis, they may prefer a lower degree of redistribution, since they expect to 
increase their income over time and thus feel to be harmed by strongly redistributive taxation 
in the future. A second argument that can be used to interpret this result is that inequalities are 
more severe in their country of origin than in Italy, hence they may consider already enough 
egalitarian a society that Italian born people may consider unequal. As for students’ 
characteristics, when we test the impact of the field of studies, we can notice that the dummy 
denoting subjects who are enrolled in a degree offered by the Department of Economics 
(ECON_DEPT) is not significant, while if we look at the actual number of economics courses 
attended by the subject (ECON_EXAMS), the variable shows a positive and highly significant 
coefficient.9 This is possibly due to the fact that economics courses emphasize redistributive 
issues better than business ones. Finally, as for the role of cultural background, individual 
beliefs about the source of income inequalities seem to affect preferences for  redistribution, 
confirming previous evidence in the literature (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and 
Angeletos, 2005; Krawczyk, 2010). In particular, the variable SUCCESS_LUCK shows a 
significant and positive coefficient, thus suggesting that subjects that place more importance on 
luck as a determinant of economic success rely more on redistributive policies and decide to 
select higher tax rates, further strengthening the interpretation of redistribution as an insurance 
mechanism.    
Overall, these results confirm the simple test of differences in average t* across treatments, 
controlling for several determinants of preferences for redistribution. To conclude, it is worth 
comparing our findings with those obtained in Durante et al. (2014), which is the only recent 
experimental study that accounted for the role of risk in determining preferences for 
redistribution, although in their paper this issue was only one of the many controls included in 
the analysis, focused on social concerns related to income inequality. Results from our 
experiment are not only consistent with, but also improve those of Durante et al. (2014). First, 
the evidence of a positive relationship between exogenous risk faced by individuals and 
preferences for redistribution proved to be robust to the adoption of a between-subject approach, 
thus suggesting that their findings were not driven by the specific within-subject design adopted, 
                                                          
9 A similar result can be found in Durante et al. (2014). 
which suffers from the well-known problems of carry-over and experimenter demand effects 
(e.g., Zizzo, 2009; Charness et al., 2012). More in detail, in their experiment Durante et al. 
(2014) asked the same subjects to state their desired level of redistribution depending on 
different initial distributions of their income, which could be ordered in terms of associated risk. 
However, as the authors point out, these different distributions were defined according to rules 
that could be ordered using their moral worthiness. Therefore, more risky distributional rules 
could have led to a higher degree of redistribution simply because they were perceived as 
rewarding unworthy people. In other words, participants may have adopted a moral criterion in 
choosing the tax rate, instead of considering an insurance mechanism for risk. Our results 
exclude this moral interpretation, since in a between-subject design only one distributional rule 
(i.e., a low-risk or a high-risk scenario, depending on the certainty of effort reward) is presented 
to each participant, who has no information on the features of the other session. Second, as for 
the role of subjective risk attitudes in driving the preferences for redistribution, while we find 
here a systematic negative correlation between RISK_LOVE and t* for subjects facing an 
uncertain reward effort, in the study of Durante et al. (2014) the associated coefficient was often 
not statistically significant and contradictory in terms of sign. A possible explanation of the 
difference is likely to be due to the less refined measure of risk attitudes – based on 1-5 scale 
instead of the 1-20 one used here – rather than to a real weakness of the relationship of interest.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this study we exploit a between-subject laboratory experiment to investigate the existence of 
a relationship between risk attitudes and preferences for redistribution. Our evidence suggests 
that when subjects face more uncertainty about the outcome of their effort (hence, their future 
position in the income distribution) they vote for a higher tax rate, and this demand for 
redistribution increases with the subjective degree of risk aversion. Our interpretation is that 
individuals look at taxation as to a form of insurance against uncertainty.  
Our results certainly are limited by the small size of our sample, and by the considerations of 
students with a specific background only. Hence, further investigations are needed to support 
the view of risk-averse people using taxes as an insurance mechanism in a risky business 
environment. However, one also needs to recognize that the outcome of redistributive policies, 
but also social mobility, need time to materialize. The passing of time increases risk on the one 
hand, but also makes time preferences a likely important factor to shape preferences for 
redistribution. As risk and time preferences are intrinsically connected (e.g., Andreoni and 
Sprenger, 2012), time can then be a confounding factor if we are interested in the role of risk, 
and vice versa. Notice that our experimental design allowed us to control for this problem, as 
the final income distribution was generated immediately and all monetary rewards were paid 
soon at the end of the session, thus eliminating any sort of late reward bias when analyzing the 
effect of risk attitudes. Nevertheless, the role of time as different from risk preferences in 
shaping preferences for redistribution represents an important issue to be investigated in a 
future test.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Experiment instructions, answer sheets and questionnaire10 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Privacy statement 
We ensure that your personal data will be collected anonymously and in accordance with the 
Italian law. Details are reported in the next paragraphs. 
As far as your personal data are concerned, we inform you that 
 personal data will be treated in anonymous form and the answer sheets will have the same 
treatment 
 the person in charge of the collection and the treatment of your data is Matteo Assandri 
 data will be collected for scientific purposes only and they will not be communicated to third 
parties 
According to art. 7 D.L. 196/2013 in the Italian law, the subject has the right to know the 
collected data, to intervene in the treatment of those data asking whether some data exist, their 
origin, the rationale and the scope of the data collection. Subjects can obtain anonymization or 
deletion if data are treated against the law. He/She can also contest, for legitimate reasons, the 
treatment of his/her personal data, even if they are in accordance with the purposes of the 
collection. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
First of all we welcome the participants and we thank them for their participation. 
The experiment you are about to be part of aims at understanding individual preferences 
formation in economic contexts and is part of a research projects of the University of Torino, 
founded by the Laboratorio di Economia Sperimentale, Cognitiva e Computazionale, University 
of Piemonte Orientale. 
                                                          
10 Instructions refer to Session 1. Participants faced an Italian language version of the below instructions.  
 
Preliminary information 
The experiment will be divided in three parts (A, B, C). In the first two you will have to take 
decisions in accordance with your preferences. Both decisions will be remunerated at the end of 
the experiment in ways that will be later described. The third part will be a demographic 
survey. Part A will deal with attitudes towards risk, Part B will deal with social preferences. 
During Part B you will be asked to solve several exercises, hence you will have some time to 
practice. 
The privacy statement has been read out loud by the experimenter as well as the those 
preliminary instructions. Each Part’s instructions will be read out loud as well. Then, you will 
have some time to ask questions and to make you choices. Once you had completed your 
choices, you have to put your pen on the table and wait silently for others subjects to finish. 
Please, check that you have all the following material on your desk. 
 “Instructions” 
 “Answers” 
 A small sheet titled “ANSWER COPY” 
 A small signed sheet with the number we assigned you 
As previously stated, you will be remunerated for participating to this experiments. You will be 
provided with an endowment in the form of tokens. During the experiments you will have the 
opportunity to take decisions that will allow you to change the amount of your endowment. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be able to convert tokens into Euros at the following 
rates: 
 1 token = 0.01€ in part A 
 1 token = 0.03 € in part B.2 
General instructions 
The following instructions have to be followed in each Part: 
 Please, remain silent while answering the questions. If you have doubts raise your hand and 
the experimenter will help you. 
 Fill the answers in the appropriate space. 
 Be careful when answering. 
 Be sincere.  
 Once you answered all the question in the Part, wait for further instructions before starting 
the next one. 
 There are no right or wrong answers. You have to answer according to your preferences.  
 Some choices will be determined by random extractions from an urn at the end of the session. 
At the end of the extractions, you can check the content of the urn. 
We thank everyone for the participation and we wish you good luck. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: PART A 
In this part you will have to take decisions under uncertainty. 
Please, be careful while answering and do it silently. If you have questions, raise your hand. 
Instructions 
Among the answer sheets, pick the one named "PART A". 
As you can see, in each row of the table you have the opportunity to choose between two 
alternatives, Column A and Column B, circling your choice in the last column from the first to 
the last row. 
As you can see: 
 Column A presents sure amounts. Each row presents an increasing amount. 
 Column B presents an all-or-nothing lottery. You can either win 150 tokens with 50% 
probability or 0 tokens with 50% probability. Such lottery does not change from one row to 
the next. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the rows will be randomly selected and you will be 
remunerated according to your choice. If you chose the lottery, you will have to play it. 
  
Example 
 Row Column A Column B Choice 
1 0 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
2 2 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
3 4 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
4 6 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
5 8 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
6 10 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
7 12 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
8 14 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
9 16 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
10 18 token 50% 20 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
 
Suppose that, at the end of the experiment, row 7 is the outcome of the random draw from an 
urn with numbers from 1 to 10. If in that row your choice was A, you will receive the amount of 
Euro corresponding to 12 Tokens. On the other hand, if the choice was B, you will have to play 
the lottery. At the end of the experiment you will have to throw a dice: if the outcome is 1, 2 or 
3 you will win 0 tokens; if the outcome is 4, 5 or 6, you will win 20 tokens. 
You can now fill Part A. Use the sheet titled Part A among Answers. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: PART B.1 
In this part you will have to take economic decisions. Each decision is allowed. You will have to 
decide according to your preferences only. Please, be careful while answering and be silent. If 
you have questions, raise your hand. 
 You will face 4x4 tables. In each cell there will be a decimal number. 
 You will have to find couples of numbers that add up to 10. The number of couples will be 
the solution and will have to be written in the appropriate row. 
 Each table contains at least one and at most four couples. 
Example 
2.15 4.19 3.22 6.01 
8.02 6.78 1.08 4.05 
1.01 7.54 4.93 9.99 
2.02 5.68 4.33 1.69 
Solution: 1 
As you can see, 6.78+3.22=10 
You have 10 minutes in order to solve correctly as much exercises as you can among those 
presented in the page titled "Training exercises" among the Answer sheets. At the end of that 
time, the correct answers will be presented to you and you will be able to self-assess your 
performance. Then, we will move to the next Part. 
You can start now. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: PART B.2 
Instructions 
This Part will develop as follows. 
1. Each one of you was provided with the same initial income. Such amount of tokens can be 
seen in the first row of section B.2 in the Answers. 
2. Each one of you has the possibility to increase such amount. In order to do it, you will have 
to solve exercises as the ones presented in Part B.1. You will have to choose a number of 
exercises between 0 and 25. Each one will allow you to increase your income. Consider 
carefully the amount of exercises you think you are able to solve. 
3. Each exercise you will commit to solve will add 2 tokens to your income, but you will not be 
allowed to leave the room until you solved correctly the number of exercises you committed to. 
You will have to report the number of exercises you chose both by circling the value in the 
appropriate table, both by writing it the number in the "Answer copy" sheet. 
4. The final income, i.e. the sum of the initial one and the one obtained with exercises, will be 
taxed. Fiscal revenues will be equally divided among participants. 
Each one of you has to select the proportional tax rate you would like to apply in case you 
would be completely free to decide for the whole society. Such rate has to be chosen among 
those in the appropriate table in the Answer sheets. 
As before, you will have to circle your choice in the table and write the number in the 
"Answer copy" sheet. 
Once you chose the tax rate, you will have to correctly solve the number of exercises you 
committed to. Those exercises are in the "Exercises" page in the Answer sheets. 
NOTICE: if you committed to solve one exercise, you will have to solve the first. If you chose 
two, the first and the second and so on. 
Once you solved all the exercises you committed to, raise your hand and the experimenter 
will check your answers. 
5. At the end of the experiment a tax rate will be randomly selected among those proposed by 
subjects by means of an extraction from an urn. Using that tax rate, we will compute the 
amount of taxes due from each one of you and the transfers. 
6. Once we will have calculated the amount of token each of you earned, they will be converted 
in Euro. 
Example: suppose there are only two participants with final income 10 and 20 tokens 
respectively. Suppose that the random draw determined that the tax rate was 50%.  
Taxes due by A will be 5, taxes due by B will be 10. Hence the fiscal revenues will be 15 and 
each subject will receive 7.5 in transfer. 
Subject A will convert an income of 10-5+7.5=12.5 token; similarly, B will convert 20-
10+7.5=17.5 token. 
You can now start. 
Once you copied your answers in the "Answer Copy" sheet, raise your hand and the 
experimenter will collect that sheet. Then you can start solving the exercises. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: PART C 
This part consists in filling the survey you find in the Answers. Now you can start. 
 
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Now we will determine the random elements according to the aforementioned rules. 
Those elements will be: 
 Tax rate 
 Part A’s row that will be paid and eventual lottery 
Then, you will have to hand in all the material we provided and come to the experimenter desk 
for receiving the payment The only thing you have to keep with you is the signed sheet with 
your number. 
  
ANSWERS 
Part A 
You have to decide if you prefer option A or option B in each row. Remember: Column A offers 
a sure amount of tokens, while Column B is a lottery that allows you to win 150 tokens with 
probability 50% and 0 tokens with probability 50%. 
 
Row Column A Column B Choice 
1 0 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
2 5 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
3 10 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
4 15 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
5 20 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
6 25 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
7 30 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
8 35 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
9 40 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
10 45 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
11 50 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
12 55 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
13 60 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
14 65 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
15 70 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
16 75 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
17 80 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
18 90 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
20 95 token 50% 150 tokens 50% 0 tokens A B 
Part B.1 
TRAINING EXERCISES 
Results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
1 
8.01 9.72 2.38 1.62 
6 
6.26 8.92 6.55 9.84 
3.40 8.38 4.81 7.47 1.97 3.27 3.61 2.09 
3.93 1.82 5.78 6.50 4.66 9.16 8.42 7.57 
5.78 8.37 1.95 3.88 4.09 7.91 3.39 5.34 
  
2 
8.36 8.34 8.48 1.75 
7 
5.09 7.61 3.42 7.98 
5.08 8.43 8.23 1.64 7.24 6.58 0.31 4.24 
9.76 2.56 4.52 2.20 4.48 2.74 2.52 7.58 
4.89 6.84 1.77 8.20 7.26 7.48 4.87 9.69 
  
3 
7.56 1.57 2.6 1.47 
8 
5.63 8.76 6.29 7.74 
9.38 8.05 8.74 7.64 4.95 2.39 8.43 9.91 
1.95 9.86 8.07 5.62 7.04 8.11 4.66 2.96 
2.28 9.41 2.50 8.73 8.96 3.87 2.80 8.50 
  
4 
6.72 2.56 5.00 7.04 
9 
8.96 8.90 7.48 6.24 
7.44 9.56 2.09 8.80 1.85 4.59 1.43 1.04 
4.77 1.54 5.55 6.78 1.42 2.76 3.73 8.15 
2.96 6.68 4.20 7.91 1.49 7.50 9.37 0.63 
  
5 
4.36 9.20 8.32 6.65 
10 
9.40 5.09 6.39 0.60 
6.61 8.21 6.99 4.45 3.22 8.06 7.00 4.66 
1.19 3.01 3.39 0.68 6.02 5.34 8.35 2.34 
7.71 4.45 9.32 1.79 3.00 8.95 9.22 1.65 
 
  
Part B.2 
Your values are the following: 
 Your initial income is 100 tokens 
 Other participants’ income is the same as yours, i.e. 100 tokens. 
 
How many exercises you want to commit to solve (from 0 to 25)? Here we reported the amount 
of income you can earn for each choice: circle the option you prefer and report the number on 
the "Answer Copy". 
 
Exercises 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Tokens 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
 
Exercises 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Tokens 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 
 
What is the tax rate you would like to implement? Circle the answer and report the number in 
the "Answer Copy". 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
 
  
EXERCISES 
Results 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
              
 
1 
4.51 4.93 4.61 9.48 
8 
4.52 1.49 3.22 2.05 
6.90 4.63 3.10 4.66 4.08 4.51 8.33 5.49 
2.01 4.97 3.70 8.50 8.51 2.75 7.25 7.07 
5.03 5.07 4.99 0.52 4.95 5.48 4.94 3.92 
  
2 
4.23 6.27 7.79 3.98 
9 
3.13 6.47 7.15 6.72 
1.18 7.63 2.35 4.13 9.51 8.18 7.38 7.11 
5.87 4.55 4.98 7.19 6.19 1.82 2.07 6.80 
4.98 7.34 3.19 7.15 2.88 6.83 5.05 5.13 
  
3 
6.84 2.65 5.06 7.59 
10 
5.73 4.59 3.93 2.47 
3.67 6.89 4.18 6.83 2.08 1.33 7.42 8.41 
6.63 5.82 7.18 3.11 5.92 7.74 7.53 9.05 
4.32 2.70 7.70 5.92 6.99 2.58 1.59 8.28 
  
4 
5.18 5.57 5.92 4.43 
11 
7.26 4.59 6.66 0.94 
5.40 9.67 3.14 9.36 5.59 1.89 1.91 2.74 
6.62 4.82 5.40 6.21 1.40 9.06 4.89 4.52 
3.08 7.57 5.13 5.69 1.49 9.16 5.51 5.41 
  
5 
4.26 6.38 5.74 8.09 
12 
3.31 1.09 7.25 2.78 
3.58 7.75 2.25 9.07 5.51 3.51 7.86 4.49 
8.96 7.56 1.91 9.49 6.41 4.88 5.79 2.14 
5.28 5.94 4.72 8.21 2.15 7.85 3.59 7.05 
  
6 
2.59 7.36 8.36 2.35 
13 
6.68 4.15 7.66 2.77 
7.41 4.24 3.59 1.90 8.48 3.26 6.54 9.25 
9.90 3.98 7.88 4.73 5.26 6.27 4.16 9.36 
2.60 5.18 5.86 6.97 2.34 5.95 3.57 3.32 
  
7 
7.09 8.84 1.95 1.96 
14 
1.22 2.12 7.68 4.24 
7.15 4.19 9.86 2.85 7.82 4.16 5.84 3.65 
9.51 8.97 5.81 4.70 4.80 1.16 7.17 6.02 
6.55 9.46 8.05 1.16 8.84 4.86 2.18 4.82 
Results 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
           
 
 
15 
9.17 1.88 3.60 2.96 
22 
2.70 2.42 7.08 2.25 
3.86 2.29 7.90 2.10 6.29 7.00 6.28 1.38 
1.04 6.03 6.40 6.14 7.76 9.76 7.58 2.24 
7.04 8.77 1.97 5.65 8.53 9.67 5.04 1.47 
 
16 
1.38 4.12 9.74 1.09 
23 
3.06 9.22 3.80 4.98 
8.59 9.97 2.52 7.48 8.43 4.24 5.76 1.75 
8.05 9.30 5.81 4.19 9.97 2.37 5.85 5.05 
7.53 7.94 7.24 0.03 6.20 7.73 1.70 7.20 
  
17 
9.50 2.66 5.62 9.12 
24 
3.71 7.00 5.93 7.31 
6.22 3.16 1.18 1.45 5.85 7.00 9.85 2.15 
4.62 4.16 8.82 3.16 9.28 7.28 0.72 9.48 
2.11 4.76 3.78 1.68 2.60 0.44 4.76 9.56 
  
18 
5.85 7.12 2.73 5.41 
25 
6.56 1.99 9.14 7.70 
5.97 6.67 1.38 1.45 6.19 2.78 5.45 7.29 
4.26 2.11 2.32 3.54 1.27 4.55 8.01 6.49 
2.88 2.85 6.72 2.70 8.25 8.73 5.50 5.32 
  
19 
3.71 3.07 2.87 0.55 
2.75 5.24 2.54 9.31 
4.92 4.16 5.84 9.45 
3.03 3.80 8.60 3.05 
 
20 
4.14 8.14 4.87 3.72 
8.44 1.64 1.86 8.89 
1.11 5.43 5.86 3.98 
4.93 8.99 1.58 6.28 
 
21 
7.08 1.06 9.24 4.82 
7.01 5.16 8.60 8.06 
1.01 3.02 6.98 7.93 
5.15 6.42 4.48 3.90 
 PART C: Survey 
In this part you are asked to fill in a demographic and opinion survey. 
1. Age _____ 
 
2. Sex:  
□ M □ F 
3. Degree:  
□ Undergraduate  □ Graduate 
4. Department:  
□ Esomas  □ Management 
5. Place of birth:  
□ Italy  □ Other 
6. Do you think your economic perspectives are better than your father’s: 
 □ Yes  □ No 
Please, evaluate the following statements according to this scale: 
 1: Strongly disagree 
 2: Disagree 
 3: Neither agree nor disagree 
 4: Agree 
 5: Strongly agree 
 
7. Luck has a pivotal role in determining people's income 
□ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5   
8. Poor are trapped in their condition because of their lack of effort in looking for a job 
□ 1  □ 2 □ 3  □ 4 □ 5   
9. How would you define your political ideology? 
□ Left  □ Centre-Left □ Centre  □ Centre-Right □ Right   
10. Did you vote in the last elections? 
□ Yes  □ No □ Not allowed   
11. On a scale from 1 (the only priority is to defend individual liberty) to 10 (the only 
priority is to reach equality among members of the society) where would you place 
yourself? 
Write a number from 1 to 10 _____  
12. How many economics courses did you attend? (e.g., Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, 
Public economics, Labor economics, Econometrics, Game Theory, ...) 
□ 0-1  □ 2-3 □ 4-5  □ 6-7 □ over 7   
13. Did you find the experiment interesting? 
□ Yes  □ No  
14. Did you attend any lesson today? 
□ Yes  □ No  
15. Did you have any difficulties in understanding the instructions?. 
□ Yes  □ No  
16. How do you grade the degree of difficulty of the exercises? 
□ Very Easy  □ Easy □ Not easy nor Hard  □ Hard □ Very Hard 
17. Did you predict correctly the number of exercises you were able to solve? 
□ Underestimated □ Yes □ Overestimated  
  
Table A1. Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis (N = 37) 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable     
RISK_LOVE 0.25 0.28 0 1 
Main regressors     
UNCERTAINTY 0.46 0.51 0 1 
RISK_LOVE 9.46 3.70 3             16 
UNCERTAINTY*RISK_LOVE 4.54 5.66 0             16 
EFFORT           12.00 6.98 2             25 
Demographic controls     
FEMALE 0.57 0.50 0 1 
AGE           21.84 2.09  18             26 
ITALIAN 0.95 0.23 0 1 
Students’ characteristics     
UNDER_GRADUATE 0.65 0.48 0 1 
ECON_DEPT 0.35 0.48 0 1 
ECON_EXAMS 4.18 2.68                0.5    7.5 
Cultural factors     
BETTER_FATHER 0.70 0.46 0 1 
SUCCESS_LUCK 3.54 0.90 1 5 
POORS_TRAP 2.43 1.09 1 4 
 
